Middle Ages Part III – Marsilius of Padua, William of Ockham, and Nicholas of Cusa
by Riccardo Piroddi
L’articolo analizza il pensiero politico di Marsilio da Padova, Guglielmo di Ockham e Niccolò Cusano, figure centrali del Medioevo. Marsilio, con il suo Defensor pacis (1324), propone una visione innovativa dello Stato, basata sulla separazione tra autorità temporale e spirituale, enfatizzando la sovranità popolare e il ruolo centrale della legge. Guglielmo di Ockham, con un approccio nominalista, contesta la supremazia papale (plenitudo potestatis) e difende l’autonomia del potere civile, affermando una distinzione chiara tra Stato e Chiesa. Niccolò Cusano, attraverso la teoria della concordantia catholica, sostiene l’importanza del consenso collettivo nella guida della Chiesa, sfidando l’autorità papale individuale e ponendo l’accento sul conciliarismo. Viene poi evidenziato come queste idee abbiano contribuito alla transizione verso modelli politici moderni, mettendo in discussione l’egemonia delle istituzioni ecclesiastiche sul potere temporale.
Marsilius of Padua and the idea of modern State
Marsilius of Padua’s political vision, as articulated in his 1324 work Defensor pacis, represents a fundamental departure from the dominant medieval political thought, so much so that it led to his condemnation for heresy. His approach centers on the conflict between the Papacy and the Empire, and he offers a distinctly secular and realistic perspective. A key figure from the municipal bourgeoisie of Padua, Marsilius advocates for a clear separation between the temporal realm of politics and the spiritual realm of religion.
In Marsilius’ view, the primary role of politics is to ensure peace and order, which are essential for the security of trade and the tranquillity necessary for business. The Pope, he argues, should abandon his political ambitions and focus solely on spiritual matters related to the afterlife. Marsilius asserts that the values protected by peace are rooted in the human sphere and derive their legitimacy from imperial authority and earthly law, not from divine intervention. These values are fully realized within the context of civil society, with peace being equated with the prosperity and well-being of the people.
Marsilius’ bold claims—such as the independence of human reason from faith and his early articulations of popular sovereignty—place Defensor pacis as a pivotal work. It not only marks the end of the Middle Ages but also anticipates the development of the modern secular state. By challenging the Church’s political hegemony and promoting the autonomy of temporal power, Marsilius laid the groundwork for the rise of a state that is governed by human laws and reason, independent of religious authority.
Marsilius of Padua conceives the state as a natural and self-sustaining community, rooted in reason and practical experience, arising from the integration of earlier forms of social organization. Its essential purpose is to provide citizens with the goods and services they need to fulfil their basic needs. This coordination is overseen by a secular legislator, distinct from any religious authority.
Marsilius advocates for elective monarchy as the ideal form of government, founded on a triad of law, peace, and monarchy. The ruler is chosen by the governed and must exercise power in accordance with the citizens’ will and needs, as sovereignty ultimately resides with the people. For Marsilius, the rule of law is paramount—the government must act within the boundaries of the law, which reflects the collective will of the citizens.
Laws are created by an earthly legislator to address the practical needs of the community and must be enforced in a way that upholds justice, limits judicial overreach, and ensures peaceful coexistence. Importantly, these laws are free from metaphysical or religious constraints and instead focus on the practical aspects of governance.
For Marsilius, the “universitas civium”—the collective body of citizens—participates in lawmaking, and only by following laws they helped create can they be truly free.
While Marsilius acknowledges religious laws, such as those from Mosaic, Evangelical, Persian, or Mohammedan traditions, he assigns them only historical or ideal significance. These religious codes do not hold authority over the political and legal spheres. Should a ruler fail to govern according to the collective will and instead impose his own desires, Marsilius would categorize him as a tyrant. Thus, the ruler’s legitimacy is tied directly to adherence to the general will of the people.
Marsilius of Padua emphasizes that the legitimacy of power hinges on adherence to the law, granting the people, or the governed, the right to remove a ruler who has violated the laws. Importantly, Marsilius does not advocate for violent uprisings or revolutionary action; instead, he proposes a constitutional solution. The removal of a ruler is to be carried out through lawful procedures, established by the legal framework or handled by specific political officers entrusted with this authority.
This presents a remarkably progressive constitutional approach to addressing the problem of tyranny. Marsilius’ idea that sovereignty—the fundamental principle of political order—resides in the universitas civium (the collective body of citizens) also extends to his vision of the Church. He contends that within the Church, the selection of priests and bishops should be determined by the community of the faithful. Similarly, the power to deliberate on excommunication and resolve major theological issues rests with the broader Christian community, not solely with ecclesiastical authorities.
In Marsilius’ vision, the role of the Church’s leadership, including the pope, is confined to spiritual guidance and moral oversight, ensuring that the behaviours of the faithful aligns with the teachings of the Gospel. When it comes to excommunication, for example, church authorities only have the authority to propose and declare it, but the decision itself is in the hands of the community. This sharply limits the Church’s power and reflects Marsilius’ broader advocacy for the separation of spiritual and temporal authority.
William of Ockham and Nominalism
William of Ockham, a British Franciscan theologian associated with the philosophical movement known as Nominalism, introduced a neo-Aristotelian and empiricist approach to politics and power. His vision sought to mediate between anthropology, pragmatism, and theology, all in accordance with the Scriptures and in direct opposition to the curialist doctrine that upheld papal supremacy.
Ockham advocated for the autonomy of civil power from spiritual authority, arguing for a clear distinction between the State and the Church and asserting the independence of the Empire. He rejected the concept of plenitudo potestatis—the belief in the Pope’s absolute power over all earthly matters. However, he also acknowledged that the unity of Europe’s diverse political entities was symbolically upheld by the papacy. For Ockham, the Pope and the Emperor were not adversaries, but rather figures both divinely appointed, each with distinct roles in their respective domains.
These conclusions were part of Ockham’s broader philosophical approach, known for its principle of simplicity, or “Ockham’s razor,” which advocated for excluding unnecessary metaphysical complexities. He formulated his political ideas around three key paradigms:
- The Law of the Gospel vs. the Law of Moses: Ockham emphasized that the Law of Christ, as expressed in the New Testament, is fundamentally a law of freedom, in contrast to the more restrictive Law of Moses. He argued that the Gospel’s interpretation must remain free and cannot be used to impose political authority, as that would equate it with the Old Testament law, undermining Christian liberty.
- Rejection of papal plenitudo potestas: Ockham firmly opposed any hierocratic theory that conferred absolute power to the Pope, considering such claims contrary to the Gospel’s law of freedom. He believed that this notion of papal power represented a sinful “will to power” that was outside the Church’s true spiritual mission. The Church, in his view, should distance itself from such ambitions
- Autonomy of private property and the Empire: Ockham argued that concepts like private property and imperial authority were secular in nature and should be stripped of any religious connotations. While politics and religion could engage in a reciprocal and dialectical relationship, he insisted that political governance should not be subordinate to religious authority.
Through these ideas, Ockham significantly contributed to the development of political thought by advocating for the separation of Church and State, while promoting the idea that religious and political powers each had their own distinct and independent spheres of influence.
Nicholas of Cusa and Conciliarism
The notion that the Council of Bishops should hold greater authority than the Pope had surfaced multiple times during the mid-14th century. The idea behind this was to ensure stability within the leadership of the Church, preventing any single individual from claiming total spiritual power, which, according to curialist thinking, would also grant political dominance. However, this concept began to decline by the early 15th century, and it forms the backdrop to Nicholas of Cusa’s theory of concordantia catholica (Catholic concord), a key contribution to the ongoing debate about power and governance in the Church.
Nicholas of Cusa, a German-born theologian and priest educated in Padua, developed this theory within a Neoplatonic framework. He proposed that the truth resides in the consensus of the majority of the faithful. While this idea had theological implications, its political and practical consequences were groundbreaking. First, Cusa argued that the Pope’s office should be elective, representing the majority of the faithful. This challenged the traditional concept of “Petrine succession,” which posited the Pope as a direct spiritual successor to Saint Peter. Instead, Cusa’s conciliarism asserted the supremacy of the collective will of the College of Bishops over the singular authority of the Pope.
The roots of the conciliarist movement lie in the Great Western Schism (1378–1417), a crisis that fractured Western Christianity. After seventy years of papal “captivity” in Avignon, the Holy See returned to Rome in 1378. This sparked a division within the College of Cardinals, with one faction, primarily anti-French, electing Pope Urban VI, while another pro-French group elected Clement VII as a rival pope. For the next forty years, the Church was split, with two competing popes and two Colleges of Cardinals.
The schism led to the rise of conciliarism, which posited that supreme ecclesiastical authority rested not with the Pope, but with an Ecumenical Council. This belief gained significant traction during the schism, as the presence of two popes made a resolution impossible. The Council of Pisa in 1409 attempted to resolve the issue but failed, leading to the Council of Constance (1414–1418). The Council successfully deposed both rival popes and elected Martin V, effectively restoring unity to the Church. It also decreed that councils would be held regularly in the future.
However, despite the Council’s success in ending the schism, the authority of future councils was eventually subordinated once again to the Pope, marking the decline of conciliarism as a dominant force. The Great Western Schism, therefore, ended with the reaffirmation of papal authority, though it left behind important reflections on the balance of power within the Church and the relationship between collective governance and individual leadership.