John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Robert Nozick,
Murray Newton Rothbard, and Anthony Giddens
by Riccardo Piroddi
Abstract: Si analizzano alcune delle principali teorie politiche e giuridiche del Novecento e della contemporaneità, mettendo a confronto modelli diversi di giustizia, ruolo dello Stato e diritti individuali. A partire dal contrattualismo di John Rawls, fondato sui princìpi di libertà fondamentale e giustizia distributiva, vengono esaminate le proposte di Ronald Dworkin, che rafforza l’idea dei diritti come preesistenti alla legge positiva, e le critiche libertarie di Robert Nozick, sostenitore dello Stato minimo e del libero mercato. Il percorso prosegue con il radicalismo anarcho-capitalista di Murray Rothbard, che rifiuta ogni forma di coercizione statale, e si conclude con la “Terza via” di Anthony Giddens, orientata a una nuova socialdemocrazia basata su welfare positivo, responsabilità individuale e cooperazione globale.
John Rawls: contractualism, social justice and global collaboration
In the early 1960s, a new political doctrine emerged in the United States, most notably articulated in John Rawls’ seminal work A Theory of Justice (1971). Rawls, drawing on Kantian philosophy, aimed to reconcile the pluralistic coexistence of diverse ideologies while ensuring the protection of fundamental rights, which he argued form the bedrock of any democratic society. His work sought to revive the contractualist tradition, particularly during times of general crisis, to reformulate a new social contract that would address the moral and political challenges of contemporary society.
Rawls offered an alternative to utilitarian theories, which had often contributed to the ungovernability of states by prioritizing the greatest good for the greatest number at the expense of individual rights. In contrast, Rawls proposed a synthesis between the core principles of liberalism and the social critique presented by socialism, aiming to combine public economic intervention (typical of socialism) with the preservation of individual freedoms and the market’s efficiency (central to capitalism). This approach aligned with the ideals of social democracy, a system that balances both state intervention and market dynamics, aiming to reduce the inequalities generated by unchecked capitalism.
His contractualist theory hinges on the notion of rational decision-making in public choices, presenting political conduct as a rational solution to the problem of social justice. Rawls’ theory does not aim to legitimize political power but instead positions itself as a framework for achieving a fair and equitable society. At its core is the “original agreement” or contract, which assumes a radical symmetry between individuals and is grounded in two fundamental principles:
- The first principle guarantees basic rights and liberties, emphasizing the primacy of freedom over equality, in line with the liberal tradition.
- The second principle addresses social justice, advocating for policies that mitigate inequality through progressive taxation and proportional redistribution of income and wealth. This principle seeks to counteract the inevitable social inequalities arising from unrestricted economic freedom and the concentration of wealth among certain social classes.
In Rawls’ vision, the equal distribution of fundamental freedoms leads to a society where equality and collective morality prevail, with the concept of “fairness” taking precedence over mere “well-being.” This approach transcends class divisions, promoting global cooperation and emphasizing that all members of society, regardless of income or social status, should benefit from a system of equity and justice.
In his later work, The Law of Peoples (1999), Rawls extends his theory of justice to the international sphere. He envisions a global order founded on cooperation between “reasonable peoples,” where nations are guided by principles of fairness and respect for human rights in their relations with one another. This international application of his theory reflects Rawls’ commitment to justice not just within societies but across borders, advocating for a fair and just global system based on mutual respect and the pursuit of common good.
Ronald Dworkin and new natural law
John Rawls’ reflections on justice and rights sparked a renewed debate in legal and political philosophy, notably advanced by Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013), who built upon natural law theory. Dworkin emphasized that individual rights are not merely products of legal codification but pre-exist within a moral framework based on recta ratio (right reason). His approach reinforced the idea that certain fundamental rights are intrinsic to human beings and must be respected regardless of state-imposed laws.
Dworkin’s theory divides law into three broad categories, each grounded in different principles:
- Targets (goals): Laws aimed at achieving specific societal objectives or public welfare goals
- Rights: Laws that protect individual liberties and entitlements, considered inviolable and inherent
- Obligations: Laws that define the duties individuals owe to each other and the state, forming the basis of social contracts.
Dworkin’s aim was to reconcile the protection of fundamental individual rights with the welfare requirements of the state, particularly in the context of the welfare state. He argued that the state’s role in providing social services, health care, and unemployment benefits must be balanced with a respect for individual rights that are not subject to government overreach. To achieve this balance, Dworkin proposed a system of progressive income taxation as a fair means of redistributing wealth, ensuring that the state can finance its social obligations without infringing on individual freedoms.
This focus on progressive taxation was crucial for Dworkin’s vision of justice, as it addressed the challenge of financing the welfare state while respecting the autonomy and rights of individuals. By advocating for taxation that aligns with the principles of fairness and redistribution, Dworkin’s theory supported the expansion of state responsibilities in areas such as healthcare, unemployment insurance, and social security, while ensuring that these interventions do not compromise the fundamental rights of individuals.
Robert Nozick
One of the most vigorous and reactionary critics of John Rawls’ theory of justice was Robert Nozick (1938-2002), a Harvard University professor, who offered an alternative liberal vision in his influential work Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974). While Nozick admired the intellectual rigor of Rawls’ theory, he vehemently opposed it, advocating instead for a “minimal state”—the only morally legitimate form of government in his view. Nozick’s vision of the state was grounded in free-market principles, individual initiative, and meritocracy, rejecting the expansive role of the state in redistributive policies and welfare that Rawls and others had championed.
For Nozick, the minimal state should limit itself to protecting individuals’ rights to life, liberty, and property, intervening only when these basic rights are threatened. He drew heavily on John Locke’s theory of property, which considered ownership of oneself and one’s labour as the foundation of all rights. Nozick extended this argument to propose that free trade and voluntary exchanges between individuals—without excessive state interference—were the true mechanisms for achieving justice. Any attempt by the state to redistribute wealth through welfare policies was, in his view, an infringement on individual liberty and property rights, and amounted to using “liberty as property over others.”
Nozick criticized the welfare state as a system that shifts the concept of freedom from self-ownership (as per Locke’s idea of liberty) to one where the state controls the property and resources of individuals for the sake of others, thus coercing people into a system that violates their natural rights. He famously compared the minimal state to a “night watchman,” whose sole role was to guard individuals against violations of their rights, rather than actively managing the distribution of wealth or imposing social programs.
Central to Nozick’s philosophy was the idea of meritocracy, which he believed should be prioritized over the welfare state’s tendency to level social inequalities. Nozick argued that welfare programs, by attempting to flatten inequalities, undermine the meritocratic principles of reward based on effort and ability. He rejected the notion of redistributive justice as outlined by Rawls, particularly the use of progressive taxation to fund social programs. Instead, Nozick rehabilitated capitalism in its purest form, arguing that free markets and voluntary cooperation were the only legitimate means of achieving fairness in society.
Nozick’s critique also addressed the structural failings of social cooperation, especially in advanced countries like the United States, where certain social problems—such as healthcare—remained unresolved. Despite the US being the world’s economic engine, Nozick noted that welfare programs had not fully implemented social cooperation in practice, and instead, had led to inefficiencies and infringements on individual freedom. In response, he proposed a system of associationism and mutual protection, where individuals could form voluntary associations to provide security and resolve conflicts, rather than relying on a large, interventionist state.
Nozick’s extreme neoliberal stance reflected a deep skepticism of government power, emphasizing personal responsibility, free markets, and minimal state interference as the only sustainable and just approach to organizing society. His work became a cornerstone of libertarian thought, standing in stark contrast to the social democratic and welfare state models advocated by Rawls and others.
Morray Newton Rothbard
Murray Newton Rothbard (1926-1995) stands as one of the most prominent advocates of libertarianism, fiercely opposing all forms of state coercion. Influenced by John Locke’s natural rights theory, Rothbard’s libertarian vision sought to eliminate what he saw as institutionalized violence perpetrated by the state. He argued that the state fundamentally denies individuals their natural rights by using force against its own citizens under the guise of law and order.
According to Rothbard, the state’s actions—such as war, military conscription, and taxation—constitute institutionalized forms of murder, slavery, and robbery. In his view, warfare is essentially mass murder sanctioned by the state, military conscription is a form of involuntary servitude, and taxation is legalized theft. The state, through these mechanisms, undermines individual freedom and autonomy, enforcing its will through coercion and the threat of violence.
Rothbard also criticized the intellectual class, whom he labelled “court intellectuals,” for legitimizing and justifying the power of the state. These intellectuals, he claimed, mystify state control by presenting it as social welfare or collective good, manipulating public consent often through the media. This deception, Rothbard argued, obscures the existence of natural law, which, with the aid of reason, allows individuals to understand what is best for themselves and society at any given historical moment.
Rothbard believed that every individual possesses the inherent capacity to think, evaluate, act, and develop their potential without the interference of the state. This natural law perspective holds that individuals are naturally endowed with the ability to reason and pursue their self-interest in ways that contribute to the common good without the need for coercive state control.
Thus, Rothbard viewed state interference—whether through regulation, taxation, or force—as fundamentally anti-human and anti-social. He maintained that the state’s coercive power violated the very essence of human freedom and social cooperation. In his vision of a truly free society, individuals would be free from state-imposed violence and able to engage in voluntary, peaceful exchanges that reflect their own interests and capacities.
Anthony Giddens’ “Third way”: positive welfare and new social democracy
Anthony Giddens distinguishes between classical social democracy, characterized by a comprehensive welfare state that provides cradle-to-grave protection for citizens, and what he calls the “Third Way”, which represents a new approach distinct from both traditional liberalism and social democracy. Giddens outlines several key innovations of this Third Way:
- Cosmopolitan democracy: Giddens challenges the concept of fixed national and ethnic identities, arguing that due to genetic blending through immigration, no one can be considered biologically “pure.” He believes that immigration benefits host countries by increasing their workforce, leading to what he terms cosmopolitan nationalism. In this framework, national identity is fluid, and democracy must embrace this diversity.
- World government: Giddens contends that issues like ecological risks and global inequality cannot be solved at the local or national level. In the information age, territory is less important to nation-states than it once was. What matters now are individual knowledge and competitive skills, rather than natural resources. This shift underscores the need for a form of global governance to address cross-border challenges.
- Community: Giddens redefines the concept of community, moving away from nostalgic notions of local solidarity. Instead, he advocates for voluntary associations such as social entrepreneurship, time banks, microcredit schemes, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). These modern forms of community engagement come from the grassroots, as seen in movements like Greenpeace and Amnesty International. Giddens argues that this depoliticized global space needs regulation and the introduction of new rights and obligations to manage it effectively.
- Positive welfare: Giddens criticizes welfare systems that focus narrowly on alleviating poverty, especially those that cause social divisions, such as in the U.S. He advocates replacing traditional welfare programs with solidarity-based systems that emphasize community support from institutions like the church, family, and friends. The state, in his view, should intervene only when these social structures fail.
- Public investment in education: Giddens emphasizes education as a critical area for public investment, viewing it as a tool for redistributing opportunities for intellectual and economic growth. He also stresses the importance of supporting the family, particularly by creating opportunities for women in emerging types of work, such as telecommuting.
Giddens introduces the concept of the welfare society as a replacement for the traditional welfare state, suggesting that third-sector organizations (NGOs, social movements, etc.) should play a larger role in providing positive welfare services. However, he recognizes that certain areas, such as health and large-scale infrastructure, cannot be entirely replaced by non-governmental bodies and will still require government involvement.
The Third Way proposed by Giddens should not be confused with other historical third ways, such as fascism, which positioned itself between liberalism and socialism. Giddens’ Third Way is new in relation to classical social democracy and neoliberalism, aiming to balance state intervention and market forces while promoting individual responsibility and community-based solidarity.
In his view, the welfare state of classical social democracy, while historically important, now creates almost as many problems as it solves. Moreover, Giddens suggests that the traditional dichotomy between socialism and capitalism is less relevant today than the tensions between libertarian and authoritarian approaches, or between modernist and traditionalist values. His Third Way seeks to navigate these shifting dynamics, promoting a flexible and adaptive framework for governance and social organization in the 21st century.
