THE WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

The Political Order’s Crisis: The Early 20^th Century

(Part 4)

Crisis’ Philosophers: Ernst Jünger, Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, and Hans Kelsen

By Riccardo Piroddi

Abstract: La visione tragica della condizione umana nel pensiero del Novecento è stata dominata da tecnologia, violenza e sistemi di controllo impersonali. Il rifiuto eroico dell’oppressione era inteso come unica forma di resistenza, sulla scia della “grande rinuncia” di Marcuse. La tecnologia, considerata l’esito finale della razionalità occidentale, appariva come strumento di alienazione e dominio, alimentando una deriva storica verso una società materialista e priva di valori. Il pensiero di Ernst Jünger descrive una modernità fondata sulla distruzione, culminata nella “mobilitazione totale” e nel dominio di un ordine tecnico globale, contro cui solo il ribelle può opporsi simbolicamente.

Heidegger, invece, interpretava la tecnologia come espressione ultima dell’oblio dell’Essere, un processo inevitabile che aliena l’uomo ma apre anche alla possibilità di pensare autenticamente l’esistenza. Schmitt contrapponeva al liberalismo una visione del politico fondata sulla decisione sovrana, soprattutto in situazioni eccezionali, dove il conflitto amico-nemico rivela la vera natura del potere. Infine, Hans Kelsen proponeva un modello normativo opposto: la centralità del diritto, della costituzione e della democrazia parlamentare come garanzia di ordine e legittimità.

Humanity’s fate is inherently tragic and eludes the grasp of rational principles. The forces of domination and violence, central to human existence, cannot be denied or eradicated but must be confronted through acts of heroic resistance, similar to Marcuse’s notion of the “great refusal.” This form of heroism is rooted in the decisive will of the individual to stand against the oppressive systems of control.

This perspective emerged from deeper reflection on the nature of technology, which was seen as the culmination—or “end”—of Western rationality. Technology, in this view, represents the will of an impersonal super-State that imposes its presence and dominion over all human beings, reducing them to instruments of its control. The result is a pessimistic vision of history as a process of irreversible degeneration, leading to a future society devoid of conscience and values, defined not by being, but by having. This future society is one where materialism and technological dominance replace genuine human experience and moral depth.

Philosophers engaged in the critique of this degenerative process, often labelled as “crisis philosophers,” saw their role as exposing this trajectory of decline. However, they refrained from offering solutions, alternatives, or resistance to this downward spiral. The sense of powerlessness in the face of overwhelming technological and political forces led many of these thinkers to withdraw or submit, abandoning the hope of resisting the conservative forces that accelerated this degeneration. Their philosophy became one of observation rather than intervention, underscoring the tragic and inescapable nature of humanity’s decline.

Ernst Jünger

Ernst Jünger’s philosophy (1895-1968) stands as one of the most significant cultural reflections of the 20th century. Jünger observed that his era was driven by a singular objective: production for destruction, which unfolded through three key historical phases:

1. The rise of the masses onto the stage of history, driven by progress
2. War, which disciplines and consumes these masses, particularly through the brutal experience of trench warfare
3. Technology, the ultimate expression of society’s militaristic origin, embodying its inherent drive toward destruction.

For Jünger, this historical trajectory—defined by motion and conflict—culminated in what he termed total mobilization, a condition in which all of society’s resources and energies are directed toward destructive ends. This process, in Jünger’s view, erased any constructive or positive values that modernity might have sought to establish. Instead, the relentless development of technology imposed an order that led inevitably to the dissolution of the State, with the worker (der Arbeiter) emerging as the central figure in this new world order.

The worker’s revolt, in Jünger’s philosophy, initiated a subversive transformation that brought about a world dominated by a global technical order. This technical order, while oppressive and alienating, created the conditions for what Jünger called the passage to the woods, a metaphor for radical rebellion. In this rebellion, the rebel seeks to reclaim their freedom by rejecting the technological Leviathans—monstrous creations of modern civilization that foster fear and alienation.

Jünger argued that these technological monsters, symbols of societal control and the alienation of the individual, led to the erosion of human rights and freedoms, as individuals increasingly transferred their natural rights to a society governed by technology and militarism. The rebel’s escape, therefore, was an act of defiance against the artificial constructs of modernity, seeking to reaffirm individual freedom in the face of overwhelming systemic domination. This vision reflects Jünger’s deep skepticism of modernity, technology, and the destructive forces they unleash on human existence.

Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), one of the most influential and controversial existentialist philosophers of the 20^th century, decisively rejected the possibility of overcoming the “age of technology.” He famously critiqued Western philosophical traditions, advocating for their deconstruction, and is often regarded as one of the greatest thinkers of modern times. His intellectual journey can be divided into two distinct, and somewhat contradictory, phases:

1. The Early Phase: Heidegger aimed to establish a new ontology that would explain the reasons for human existence, particularly through his analysis of Dasein—the being that is aware of and questions its own existence.
2. The Later Phase: Heidegger shifted focus, turning away from the study of the individual and concentrating on the metaphysical problem of Being itself. In this phase, he posited that the individual is not central but instead plays the passive role of a “guardian” or “shepherd” of truth. In this framework, truth originates solely from Being, and the individual is merely a witness to its unveiling.

Heidegger argued that the nihilism imposed by technology—a force driven by the will to power and control over the world—was a fundamental, incurable disease of Western civilization. This trajectory of thought, according to Heidegger, began with Plato and has manifested itself through dominant linguistic structures (Greek, Latin, and German) for over 2,500 years.

He identified several key characteristics of technology:

• Instrumental Character: technology reduces the essence of things to their usability. The world is understood not in its inherent meaning but in its utility, with practice and functionality as the fundamental structures of Being (Dasein)
• Radical Critique of Subject-Object Relationship: In his existentialism, Heidegger criticized the traditional subject-object dichotomy, suggesting that human existence (Dasein) does not relate to objects from an external vantage point, but is instead embedded in a world of practical involvement
• Political Order as a Reflection of Natural Order: Heidegger saw the political sphere as a microcosm of the natural world. Humans are social beings who must come together to confront the pressures of natural needs and conditions. This socialization is a fundamental aspect of human existence
• Political Philosophy as Philosophical Anthropology: For Heidegger, political philosophy is an extension of philosophical anthropology. Although grounded in rational thought, it remains bound and limited by metaphysics, which, in his view, is inherently flawed
• Confusion of Truth with “Measurable Precision”: Heidegger critiqued the modern scientific tradition, beginning with Descartes, for equating truth with measurable precision. This reductionist view, where truth becomes confined to what can be quantified and measured, exemplifies the impoverishment of thought under the reign of technology and scientific rationalism.

Heidegger’s critique of technology was not merely a rejection of machines or tools but a broader condemnation of the mindset that technology fosters—a worldview that prioritizes control, mastery, and domination over the natural world and human existence. In this framework, human beings become mere resources, manipulated within a system that ultimately alienates them from authentic experience and the deeper truths of Being. For Heidegger, this technological nihilism could not be overcome but only recognized and faced with a deep reflection on the essence of existence.

For Heidegger, technology is not merely a tool or a human invention but a profound manifestation of Being—the fundamental structure of reality. It reveals that the world cannot be reduced to human meanings or purposes; instead, it is a reflection of Being itself, a superior entity that transcends the simplistic notion of a God as envisioned in Christian theology. For Heidegger, this Being is not a “Saviour of the world” in the Christian sense but a metaphysical presence that shapes existence and is beyond human control.

Technology, in Heidegger’s view, represents the culmination of metaphysics—the final stage of Western thought, which has been on a trajectory of forgetting the true nature of Being for centuries. The dominance of technology reflects the oblivion of Being, as humans have become increasingly detached from their authentic existence. In this state of oblivion, Being has seemingly receded into “nothingness,” relinquishing its influence over humanity. However, Heidegger argues that the presence of Being endures subtly within the individual, despite its apparent absence from the world.

Heidegger believed that the exclusivity of human reason could be overcome not through abandoning reason but through the awareness and acceptance of human finitude. This acceptance opens up a space within the individual for an inner conflict that often leads to nihilism—an existential confrontation with the meaninglessness of life. Yet, this experience of nihilism also offers an opportunity for thinking, which Heidegger considered the greatest gift of Being. For him, the act of thinking is not simply a rational activity but a form of thanking—a deep acknowledgment and gratitude toward Being itself for allowing existence to unfold.

This framework helps explain Heidegger’s controversial relationship with Nazism. Heidegger saw Nazism not as a political ideology to be contested or supported in conventional terms, but as an inevitable historical event that gave Germany the chance to assert its strength in the world. For him, Nazism represented a manifestation of the same historical forces that technology and metaphysics had unleashed in Western civilization. Rather than opposing or confronting it, Heidegger perceived Nazism as a part of the tragic unfolding of history, an unavoidable destiny for Germany and the West. His failure to directly challenge Nazism is often attributed to his view that it was a reflection of a deeper metaphysical crisis that could not be resolved through political means.

In this sense, Heidegger’s philosophy—particularly his focus on the ontological structure of reality—rejected simplistic moral or political solutions to the dilemmas of his time. Instead, he emphasized the need for individual reflection and an understanding of Being’s role in shaping human destiny, even when that destiny appeared tragic or nihilistic.

Carl Schmitt

Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), a German jurist and political theorist, was known for his conservative Catholic perspective and for pioneering decisionism, a philosophical and political approach that breaks with the rationalism and individualism of modern thought. In his influential work Political Theology (1922), Schmitt shifted the focus of political theory from questions about how decisions are made to who has the authority to decide, particularly in exceptional circumstances that lie outside the normal functioning of the legal system. He famously defined sovereignty as the power to decide during a state of emergency, when legal norms are suspended.

Schmitt was critical of both liberalism and legal positivism, which he saw as reducing politics to a mere collection of legal norms that regulate the State. In contrast, Schmitt argued that politics goes beyond legal frameworks, encompassing the horizon of decisions that affect both individuals and the system itself. Political order, in his view, does not arise from rational consensus but from disorder, often through decisions made by individuals, revolutions, or even violence. Schmitt warned that a neutral stance, which ignores the extra-legal origins of political power, results in a society incapable of dealing with crises and disorder.

Key stages of Schmitt’s thought:

1. Critique of Liberalism: Schmitt rejected liberalism’s reliance on bourgeois ideals, dismissing it as detached from real-world politics. He criticized idealism, seeing it as an internal dialogue of the subject rather than an engagement with external political reality. As an alternative, he pointed to the Catholic Church, which he argued had the authority to reconcile competing interests and maintain order, uniting diverse realities under its power
2. Critique of Modernity: Schmitt believed that modern politics had lost touch with the problem of the origin of political order. Instead of addressing real conflicts, modern parliamentary systems had degenerated into mere “academies of futile discussions.” He traced this to Thomas Hobbes’ theory of dictatorship, where political authority is based not on rational discourse but on an absolute, often irrational, decision made by a sovereign authority. This act of decisionism is a creative force, bringing order out of chaos, as represented by Hobbes’ Leviathan
3. The Origin of Politics: Schmitt argued that the foundation of political power lies in the ability to distinguish between friend and enemy, a concept central to his theory of political order. Politics, in Schmitt’s view, is inherently conflictual, characterized by internal and external divisions and struggles. A politician must recognize those who oppose or support their strategies and act accordingly. This friend-enemy distinction is particularly evident in international relations, where the conflict between States exemplifies the ultimate form of political struggle. Domestically, Schmitt viewed civil war as an inevitable and necessary conflict, where one faction must prevail over another through force, defining politics as the process of eliminating internal enemies.

Schmitt believed that in the liberal State, power was subjected to the influence of economic interests and the compromises of a fragmented political system, which diluted the State’s true purpose: safeguarding the life and welfare of the people. In response, he called for a restoration of State authority through decisive political action. Schmitt’s maxim, “auctoritas, non veritas facit legem” (authority, not truth, makes law), highlights his belief that political legitimacy arises from the authority of the sovereign, not from abstract notions of truth or justice.

This authority, according to Schmitt, is cemented by the acclamation of the people, who spontaneously rally around a leader who embodies the law and provides protection and guidance. This leader represents the will of the people, but in a way that transcends the procedural mechanisms of democracy and liberalism.

Schmitt was critical of both democracy and the liberal regime:

• He argued that democracy diminishes politics by introducing the shapeless mass of the people into political life, undermining clear decision-making
• He viewed the liberal regime as flawed because it pits individual freedoms against State authority, replacing the principle of legality with that of legitimacy and representation, thereby weakening the State’s ability to act decisively.

In sum, Schmitt’s political philosophy calls for a return to strong, decisive leadership in the face of crises, rejecting liberalism’s emphasis on proceduralism and individual rights in favour of a political order based on authority and the power to act in exceptional circumstances.

Hans Kelsen

The thought of Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) begins with his analysis of the crisis of the modern State, focusing on a critique of the traditional concept of sovereignty. As a Viennese jurist, Kelsen challenged the notion that sovereignty is central to the definition of the legal sphere. Instead, he proposed that law should be “purified” of any political or sociological influence, establishing it as an autonomous and logical system of effective rules. In this view, it is not politics that creates law, but law that dictates the structure and limits of political action.

For Kelsen, the State itself is a legal system defined by a particular degree of centralization. The crisis of the State, therefore, is not a failure of the legal system but results from a growing dissociation between the concept of sovereignty and the legal framework. Kelsen argued that this gap should be resolved through the construction of a monistic system that integrates politics into a unified and global legal order. He opposed Carl Schmitt’s idea that political legitimacy is rooted in the sovereign’s decision during exceptional circumstances. Instead, Kelsen believed that the legitimacy of political action stems from adherence to a single fundamental norm, known as the Grundnorm (basic norm).

The Grundnorm is an abstract, formal principle that underpins the entire legal structure, both domestically and internationally. It serves as the foundational rule from which the validity of all other legal norms is derived, ensuring the coherence and autonomy of the legal system.

Two key consequences arise from Kelsen’s normativism:

1. Primacy of the Constitution: The Constitution is the highest source of law, shaping and constraining the legislative activities of Parliament. It establishes the legal framework within which all political actions and laws must operate, ensuring the rule of law is upheld.
2. Primacy of Parliamentary Democracy: Kelsen placed significant importance on Parliament not only as the embodiment of popularsovereignty but also as an institution that protects political minorities. Parliamentary democracy, according to Kelsen, provides a structure in which different social and political ideals can be debated and where minorities have the opportunity to become majorities over time. This dynamic makes Parliament the most suitable forum for mediating between competing interests and ideals, fostering dialogue and stability within the legal and political order.

In summary, Kelsen’s legal theory prioritizes the rule of law over political decisions, emphasizing that legitimacy stems from a formal legal structure rather than from the exercise of sovereign will. His belief in the primacy of the Constitution and parliamentary democracy presents a stark contrast to more authoritarian or decisionist views of the State, advocating for a legal system that both guides political action and safeguards democratic principles.