The Restoration and the Rise of Liberalism
By Riccardo Piroddi
Abstract: Il periodo della Restaurazione in Europa (1814-1848) mirò a ristabilire l’ordine politico e sociale pre-rivoluzionario, basandosi su monarchia, legittimità dinastica e autorità aristocratica, in reazione agli sconvolgimenti della Rivoluzione francese e dell’epoca napoleonica.
Pur opponendosi agli ideali di libertà ed eguaglianza, mantenne alcuni princìpi liberali come certezza del diritto, uguaglianza davanti alla legge e tutela della proprietà, insieme a elementi del Codice Civile napoleonico. Parallelamente, l’ascesa della borghesia e la Rivoluzione industriale modificarono profondamente la società, preparando le rivoluzioni del 1830 e del 1848.
Le critiche alla Rivoluzione francese emersero su più fronti: Edmund Burke esaltò la continuità storica e il ruolo della tradizione; Joseph de Maistre e Lamennais offrirono una visione cattolica e conservatrice, fondata su autorità divina e centralità della Chiesa; Benjamin Constant propose un liberalismo moderato, distinguendo tra libertà “dei moderni” e “degli antichi” e sostenendo la separazione dei poteri per evitare derive tiranniche. Il pensiero di Saint-Simon e Comte introdusse una nuova relazione tra politica e scienza: il positivismo, fondato su razionalità, progresso scientifico e cooperazione sociale. Saint-Simon puntò su una direzione industriale e collaborativa della società; Comte sviluppò la sociologia e concepì la “Religione dell’umanità”, sostituendo strutture religiose e politiche tradizionali con un ordine guidato da principi scientifici e morali.
The Restoration period in Europe sought to heal the philosophical, political, and social fractures caused by the French Revolution by re-establishing traditional, immutable, and transcendent foundations of governance. This effort emphasized principles such as absolutism, the divine and dynastic legitimacy of monarchs, and a return to pre-revolutionary political philosophies. It aimed to partially restore the authority of monarchies and the power of the aristocracy, which had been eroded by Napoleonic conquests and revolutionary fervour. The primary focus was not on affirming individual rights or the political autonomy of citizens, but on reinstating a stable order that prioritized the preservation and organization of society for peaceful coexistence.
The “restored” monarchies of Europe, although reacting against the revolutionary ideals of liberty and equality, often failed to account for the emerging influence of the bourgeoisie. Unlike the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie wielded considerable economic power, holding the financial reins of many Western European nations. Despite the conservative impulses of the Restoration, liberal ideas persisted. Key principles such as legal certainty, equality before the law, and the protection of fundamental rights—particularly the right to property—were retained, echoing the ideals enshrined in the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act.
Moreover, the Napoleonic Civil Code of 1806, along with the administrative framework of the French state, became influential models throughout Europe. The concurrent Industrial Revolution, which was at its height in England and spreading across Europe, further drove advancements in scientific study and practical technologies aimed at boosting productivity and economic growth. These evolving social and economic dynamics set the stage for the revolutionary upheavals of 1830 and, more significantly, those of 1848.
The Congress of Vienna (1814), central to the Restoration agenda, sought to re-establish the European order by reinstating pre-revolutionary rulers through the principle of legitimacy. Although many Napoleonic laws were repealed, the feudal system was never fully revived. The Napoleonic Code remained in force temporarily, awaiting the development of new national legal codes that would better reflect the altered political and social landscapes of post-revolutionary Europe.
French Revolution’s critical thinkers
The French Revolution also gave rise to a group of critical thinkers who argued that the revolution was driven by abstract ideals disconnected from the gradual, concrete, and collective historical evolution of humanity. These critics believed that politics should not disregard “tradition,” which they viewed as a collection of values and experiences that embody the unique identity of a nation and its people.
In 1790, Edmund Burke (1729–1797) articulated this critique in his famous pamphlet Reflections on the Revolution in France. Burke emphasized the fragility and instability of the 1789 Revolution by contrasting it with the English Revolution of 1688. The English Revolution, he argued, had restored order by respecting tradition, whereas the French Revolution sought to break entirely from the past, creating a political order without historical continuity. According to Burke, the collective life of a society is always shaped by the succession of generations, bound together by tradition, which serves as a vital link between the past and the present.
Burke also stressed that political science should be grounded in empirical observation and practical experience. Politics, he argued, must reflect the prudence and wisdom gained from real-life events. For Burke, the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity could not be understood as universal principles but rather as virtues that arise from the natural and necessary resolution of political conflicts, stemming from a harmonious alignment between political order and the natural world.
From this perspective, every legal system must minimize its interference in the lives of individuals. Instead, it should rely on intermediate institutions—such as political parties, parliaments, and corporations—that can maintain a balance between individual liberty and state power. These institutions, according to Burke, are essential for preserving the delicate equilibrium between freedom and authority in a stable society.
Burke’s critique also extended to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789), arguing that such rights could only be understood as the concrete historical product of a particular people, not as abstract principles proclaimed by an assembly lacking genuine authority. Burke believed that rights are deeply rooted in the lived experience of a nation, not simply granted by legislative bodies with no direct, effective power over their enforcement.
In both France and Germany, critiques of the Revolution fostered a form of deterministic, Catholic, and conservative political theology. This movement aimed to provide an ideological and philosophical rationale for the restoration of the Ancien Régime. One of the key figures in this counter-revolutionary thought was Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821). In his works Studies on Sovereignty (1794–96) and Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions (1814), de Maistre argued that the foundation of political order is divine law, not human reason. He asserted that humans, inherently incapable of self-governance, require sovereignty grounded in sacrifice and punishment.
De Maistre viewed the French Revolution as the manifestation of a supernatural “perversion.” He claimed that it was not man but Satan who acted through revolutionary France, embodying an evil that had engulfed all of Europe. To de Maistre, the solution lay in overturning the revolutionary Constitutions and Declarations, replacing them with the authority of the pope, who he considered the only supra partes judge and mediator for sovereigns.
The relationship between politics, tradition, and the Church—as the ultimate institution safeguarding continuity—was central to the philosophy of Félicité Robert de Lamennais (1782–1854). Lamennais maintained that restoration should be driven by a Catholic political party, which would resolve the political and moral contradictions stemming from the ascendancy of the bourgeois class. He believed that only the Church could reconcile the principles of liberty and authority in a way that addressed the destabilizing effects of the revolution and the unchecked ambitions of the rising bourgeoisie.
Benjamin Constant
In addition to Catholic critiques, more moderate voices emerged in response to the French Revolution, focusing on two primary concerns: the disconnect between freedom and democracy, and the close relationship between political development and scientific progress. Among these critics, Benjamin Constant (1767–1830) offered a nuanced perspective in his work Principles of Politics Applicable to All Governments (1806). Constant introduced a new conception of liberalism, attempting to reconcile the founding principles of the Revolution—liberty, equality, and popular sovereignty—with the recognition that unchecked power could lead to tyranny. He argued that this is precisely what happened during the French Revolution, which, despite its initial aims, devolved into a tyrannical regime that culminated in both the “Reign of Terror” and the rise of Napoleon.
Constant framed this deterioration through his “theory of two revolutions”: the first, in 1789, he characterized as legitimate and constitutional, aimed at dismantling the privileges of absolutism. The second, in 1793, he saw as violent and illegitimate, embodied by the “Jacobin terror.” From a revolution meant to affirm liberty arose a government more absolute than the monarchy it replaced. As a result, Constant advocated for the strict limitation of state sovereignty, arguing that the state’s role should be confined to providing guarantees rather than exercising unchecked authority. He believed that political power must be structured constitutionally to ensure both the broad consent of citizens and the protection of civil society against potential abuses.
Constant envisioned a political system based on a balance of powers and mutual safeguards. He proposed a representative system organized around five distinct “powers”: a neutral supreme judge (juge suprême), tasked solely with ensuring and overseeing the proper functioning of government bodies; an executive branch composed of ministers and bureaucrats; a hereditary chamber representing stability and continuity; an elective chamber embodying public opinion; and a judicial branch. This system of counterweights, he believed, would create the necessary checks to prevent the concentration of power and protect individual freedoms.
Another cornerstone of Constant’s political philosophy was his view of private property, which he considered the material foundation of personal freedom. In his view, true freedom could only be enjoyed by property owners, as property provided the autonomy necessary to exercise political rights. This belief led to the exclusion of the poor from political participation, as Constant argued that those without property lacked the independence required for true liberty. This position also laid the groundwork for a state in which economic inequality generated distinct social classes.
Constant further distinguished between the “freedom of the moderns” and that of the ancients. Modern freedom, according to him, is centered on the rights of the individual, emphasizing personal autonomy and the protection of property. In contrast, the freedom of the ancients prioritized the subordination of individual liberty to the interests of the collective. This shift, Constant argued, was driven by three factors: the expansion of the modern state’s involvement in social life, the formal abolition of slavery (ratified in the Treaty of Vienna in 1815), and the incorporation of republican ideals into a state that maintained limited power over individuals.
Political power and science: a new relationship
The relationship between politics and science, as developed through the lens of Positivism by Claude Henri de Saint-Simon and Auguste Comte, took a markedly different path from Constant’s liberalism. Saint-Simon (1760–1825) argued that philosophy, politics, and morals must be redirected towards their fundamental purpose: fostering conditions for social happiness through “social collaboration,” driven by the economic power of industrialists. For Saint-Simon, this objective could only be achieved through a positive analysis—one rooted in hard sciences—of industrial society, which had ushered in significant human progress due to new discoveries and technological advancements.
Saint-Simon viewed this emerging industrial society as inherently “positive” because it introduced a new organizing principle for the social fabric, grounded in the dynamic power of the bourgeoisie and the economic strength of industrialists, the rising classes of the period. He proposed a historical philosophy that distinguished between “organic eras”—times of societal harmony dominated by myth and magic, such as antiquity and the Middle Ages—and “critical eras,” in which this harmony dissolved, as seen during the Protestant Reformation or the French Revolution, under the pressure of rational, scientific thinking. Saint-Simon believed that only positive philosophy, a rational and scientific approach, could restore a new harmonious order in politics, religion, philosophy, and economics. He even envisioned governance being led by scientists rather than politicians, as politics itself should be a scientifically grounded field focused on techniques that ensure social cooperation and the management of collective interests.
Saint-Simon’s vision extended to a redefinition of Christianity, shifting from a theological framework to one based on the principle of love for one’s neighbour, reflecting a new moral philosophy that matched the industrial era’s need for collaboration and social cohesion.
Auguste Comte (1798–1857), who was once Saint-Simon’s secretary, took these ideas even further. More theoretically inclined, Comte advanced the Saint-Simonian idea of positive philosophy to its ultimate implications, proposing a framework that reconciled political order with scientific progress through his concept of the “philosophy of humanity.” He outlined three historical stages in the development of human thought: the theological, metaphysical, and scientific (or positive) stages. According to Comte, society would progress through these stages, culminating in the dominance of the scientific or positive stage, where a rational, scientific understanding of society would take precedence.
Comte’s development of social physics, or sociology, was rooted in this scientific view of humanity. He believed that sociology should be grounded in two philosophical principles: solidarity and love among human beings. He argued that the contradictions inherent in the industrial system could only be resolved through a mental and moral renewal of individuals, fostering unity across the political and social factions perpetually in conflict.
Comte’s ultimate goal was the creation of a new “Religion of Humanity,” a secular, positivist faith enshrined in his work The Catechism of Positive Religion (1852). This new religion centered on the veneration of the “Great Being,” which he defined as humanity itself. The doctrine of this religion was built upon two dogmas: positive philosophy and the laws of science, emphasizing a worldview where science and rationality replaced traditional religious and political structures in guiding human society.
