The Rise of Modern State
Part II
Abstract: Baruch Spinoza e John Locke partono entrambi dalla riflessione sullo stato di natura per fondare la legittimità del potere politico, ma giungono a visioni profondamente diverse. Spinoza vede lo stato di natura come un ambito in cui ogni individuo ha diritto a tutto ciò che può ottenere con la propria forza, ma riconosce che la convivenza pacifica è possibile solo se guidata dalla ragione. Da qui nasce l’esigenza dello Stato, fondato su un patto sociale revocabile, che tuteli l’utilità comune senza annullare i diritti inalienabili come la libertà di pensiero. Egli preferisce la democrazia, dove il potere resta distribuito tra i cittadini. Locke, invece, considera lo stato di natura un contesto fondato su ragione e cooperazione, ma fragile per via delle passioni umane. Il patto sociale serve a proteggere i diritti naturali — vita, libertà e proprietà — istituendo uno Stato che agisca da giudice imparziale. Locke insiste sul ruolo centrale della proprietà e sulla necessità di separazione dei poteri per evitare abusi. Rifiuta ogni forma di sovranità assoluta e giustifica la resistenza al potere tirannico come diritto legittimo, seppur estremo. Entrambi i filosofi, pur da prospettive diverse, pongono la libertà individuale al centro della loro concezione dello Stato.
Baruch Spinoza
Spinoza (1632–1677) begins his political analysis with assumptions similar to those of Hobbes: the State is necessary to overcome the uncertainty and precariousness of life in the state of nature. However, while both philosophers share this starting point, their conclusions diverge significantly.
For Spinoza, the state of nature is one where each individual’s rights extend as far as their power allows. Every person has the right to pursue their self-preservation and personal benefit to the fullest extent of their abilities. This concept arises from Spinoza’s pantheistic philosophy, which asserts that God and nature are one and the same (Deus sive natura—God, that is, nature). Just as God’s power is expressed in complete freedom, so too is the power of nature, which includes human beings with all their rationality and passions.
In his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Spinoza argues that the laws and institutions of nature coincide with the natural rules governing each individual. Human actions, in his view, are naturally determined to exist and unfold in a specific way. Since nature’s power is the same as God’s, it follows that nature has the right to everything it can accomplish, meaning the right of nature is as broad as its power.
Spinoza’s interpretation of the natural state might seem like an even more radical version of Hobbes’ homo homini lupus (man is a wolf to man). Yet, Spinoza’s outlook differs in that if all men were purely rational and lived solely under the guidance of reason, each could exercise their rights without harming others. In such a scenario, the natural state would not necessarily lead to conflict and violence but could instead foster peaceful coexistence under rational self-governance. However, Spinoza acknowledges that humans are often guided by passions, not just reason, which complicates this ideal vision.
Wisdom, according to Spinoza, is not the common state of humanity. Most people are driven by their passions and desires, which compel them to pursue personal gain, even at the expense of others. In this relentless pursuit, individuals often resort to deceit and betrayal to achieve their goals. If humans were to remain in the state of nature, they would be doomed to live in a world dominated by enmity, hatred, and mutual harm. As a result, they would be unable to attain the peace and security they naturally crave.
To escape this chaotic condition and secure both personal profit and safety, individuals must leave the state of nature by relinquishing their natural right to everything and transferring it to the community through a social pact. In doing so, they form a political entity known as the State. For Spinoza, the State has two essential functions: to enact laws and to punish those who violate them. He believes that the threat of punishment is the most effective way to deter people from unjustly harming others and breaking the law.
Spinoza advocates for democracy as the best form of government. In a democracy, the natural rights individuals once held in the state of nature are not surrendered to a single ruler (as in Hobbes’ absolutism) but are shared collectively by all who enter the social contract. This system preserves the freedom that nature grants to everyone because individuals do not transfer their rights permanently to a sovereign but rather to the majority, of which they are still a part. Thus, under democracy, people remain equal, much like they were in the state of nature, but now live in a more organized and peaceful society.
The stark contrast between Hobbes’ absolutism and Spinoza’s democracy can be partly explained by the different political environments in which the two thinkers lived. Hobbes, writing amidst the turmoil of the English Civil War, emphasized the need for strong, centralized authority to maintain order, while Spinoza, living in the relatively freer Dutch Republic, championed a form of government that respected individual liberty and collective governance.
Hobbes lived through the tumult of the English Civil War, which shaped his belief in the necessity of restoring the strong monarchical power of the Stuarts. In contrast, Spinoza resided in the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, a nation that had successfully gained independence from Spain and flourished internationally under the leadership of the merchant class. This republic also distanced itself from the Church and implemented a progressive, representative government for its time.
Spinoza’s political philosophy diverges from Hobbes in another crucial aspect: the nature of the social pact. From Spinoza’s perspective, the social contract is revocable. Men enter into this agreement to secure their individual benefit, but if society fails to deliver on its promise of common utility—the foundational purpose of the pact—it loses its legitimacy and can be annulled. Unlike Hobbes, Spinoza contends that the sovereign authority established through the social contract does not possess absolute power. No individual, upon entering the contract, forfeits their rights to such an extent that they abandon the core of their human nature.
For Spinoza, certain rights are inalienable and sacred, and their surrender is both unreasonable and impossible without stripping a person of their humanity. The most fundamental of these is the freedom of thought. While the State may restrict certain actions, it cannot—and must not—interfere with the freedom of thought, speech, or teaching, except in extreme cases where such freedoms pose a direct threat to the State’s existence.
Spinoza argues that every citizen retains the right to freely exercise their reason, even if it leads them to critique the laws of the State. The primary concern of the State should be the actions of its citizens, not their ideas. Spinoza’s contractualism, therefore, highlights the importance of a democratic system that respects inalienable rights—rights so integral to human nature that individuals cannot renounce them, even if they wished to.
John Locke
John Locke (1632–1704) is widely regarded as the founder of Liberal Contractualism, a philosophy in which natural rights and the limits these rights impose on established authority are central, particularly the inviolability of property rights. This focus on natural rights helps explain the influence of Locke’s political writings in England, France, and the United States, where his ideas played a foundational role in the development of human rights doctrines.
In his Two Treatises of Government (1690), Locke presents a theoretical reconstruction of the transition from the original state of nature to the formation of a political society. Locke posits that the state of nature was one of substantial equality among individuals, free from any inherent subordination or subjection. Unlike Hobbes, Locke asserts that monarchical power does not derive from divine authority, nor is it analogous to paternal authority.
Locke’s concept of natural law emphasizes that because men are equal and independent, no one has the right to harm another’s life, health, liberty, or possessions. This is in direct contrast to Hobbes’ view of the natural state, where self-preservation often justified preemptive violence. In Locke’s interpretation, natural law is binding even in the absence of formal government, as there are mechanisms to punish wrongdoers. In the state of nature, individuals retain the right to enforce the law by holding violators accountable in the eyes of their community, applying punishments that uphold reason and justice.
The transition from the state of nature to a political society, through a social contract, is not primarily driven by the need for a coercive authority to enforce laws, as Hobbes argues. Instead, Locke believes the social contract is necessary to protect individuals from the destructive potential of the “state of war,” a condition that could erupt at any time due to human passions and instincts. While reason can guide people to live peacefully, their impulses often lead them into conflict. Therefore, the establishment of government is crucial to safeguard individuals from such dangers and to secure the protection of their natural rights, particularly life, liberty, and property.
In Locke’s philosophy, the role of the State is not that of an oppressor, but rather an impartial judge tasked with peacefully resolving disputes among individuals. Locke makes an important distinction between the state of nature and the state of war.
The state of war is marked by enmity, wickedness, violence, and mutual destruction, and it can arise from two scenarios: either through the breakdown of the peaceful state of nature or from conflicts within a civil society when one person attempts to dominate another through force. The state of nature, by contrast, is characterized by peace, goodwill, mutual assistance, and cooperation, where individuals coexist according to reason, without the presence of a sovereign. In this natural state, men hold the power to judge one another’s actions.
However, Locke acknowledges the risk that the state of nature can devolve into a state of war, which can be prolonged indefinitely. To prevent such a collapse, people must come together to form a society and establish a sovereign power—an impartial judge, embodied by the State, capable of resolving conflicts and maintaining peace.
One of the State’s most fundamental roles is the protection of private property. Locke views property as a natural right that predates the creation of political society. The historic significance of Locke’s liberalism lies in his firm linkage between private property and individual liberty. For Locke, the right to property is so central to his ideology that he often uses the term “property” to encompass all the essential rights the State must guarantee: life, liberty, and possessions. Thus, the protection of property is not only an economic concern but also a key to safeguarding individual freedom.
Locke legitimizes private ownership of resources that belong to everyone—such as land—by grounding it in a fundamental human principle: while the earth is common to all, each individual owns his own person. From this, Locke argues that since a person owns his labour, he also owns whatever he produces through that labour. Thus, when someone works on a piece of land, they rightfully claim ownership of it and its fruits.
However, Locke places limits on this right to private appropriation. Individuals can only appropriate as much as they can consume. It would violate the law of nature to hoard resources, such as gathering fruit or catching fish, and allowing it to spoil without others having the opportunity to benefit. The same applies to land: a person can rightfully claim ownership of as much land as they can work—hoeing, sowing, and cultivating it—so long as they use its produce.
Locke’s conception of the state of nature envisions a community of small landowners—”rural farmers”—who work the land for their sustenance. In reality, however, Locke lived in a time of great social and economic inequality, where property and wealth were unevenly distributed. This disparity arose with the introduction of money as a medium of exchange. Before the advent of money, goods were perishable and could not be hoarded in excess. But with money, individuals could accumulate wealth indefinitely, buy large tracts of land, and profit from their produce. Locke justifies this inequality on the grounds that society has collectively agreed to the use of money, which facilitates this accumulation.
By providing a theoretical justification for private appropriation of natural resources and capitalism’s potential for unlimited accumulation, Locke is often regarded as the father of liberal thought. For Locke, the primary reason individuals submit to government is to protect their property. This is achieved not only by assigning the State the role of an impartial judge but also by empowering it to establish common laws (the legislative function) that ensure the safety, well-being, and prosperity of all citizens. However, the legislative power must respect certain inviolable limits: it must uphold the laws of nature and protect the fundamental rights of individuals, especially the rights to life and property.
The functions of the State, according to Locke, must be organized in such a way as to prevent any one branch from overpowering the others. A clear distinction between legislative and executive power is essential. The legislative power meets periodically, not permanently, to create laws, while the executive must continually ensure the enforcement of these laws. Importantly, those who possess the authority to enforce the laws (the executive) do not have the power to make them and are bound by the laws themselves. Similarly, those who legislate (the legislative) do not have direct control over coercion. While the legislative power is supreme, the executive is subordinate and responsible for applying the laws created by the legislature.
Locke’s model for governance is based on the English constitutional monarchy as established by the Glorious Revolution of 1688–1689, with key principles enshrined in the Bill of Rights of 1689. In this system, the supreme governing body is the “King in Parliament,” where the monarch shares legislative power with Parliament, specifically the House of Commons. Judicial authority, meanwhile, is vested in the House of Lords and appointed judges.
In keeping with his belief in the limited nature of sovereign power, Locke also advocates for the right of subjects to resist tyranny. This right of resistance is grounded in natural law, which he considers superior to positive, or man-made, law. However, Locke does not encourage violent revolution except as a last resort. When a government seeks to enslave its people, and no higher judge exists to resolve the conflict, Locke argues that people have the right to appeal to God or to the higher law of nature, which authorizes them to overthrow a government that fails to fulfill its responsibilities.
This theory of resistance, however, faces contradictions. Since there is no ultimate judge to mediate between the people and a despotic sovereign, the right of resistance risks returning society to a state of nature—a condition Locke acknowledges could result from the despotic exercise of power. This raises the paradox that, in seeking to avoid tyranny, the people may inadvertently dissolve the very order they sought to protect.
